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ARGUMENT
I, LLOYD OFFERS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE ALLEGATION
THAT THE INTENDED TRANSFERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ILLEGAL,
CAUSING HIS ENTIRE UNCLEAN HANDS THEORY TO FAIL.
Like the trial court below, Lloyd argues that the transfer of the property from
Alta's trust to Lloyd based on his fraudulent representations and Lloyd's fraudulent
promise to return that property to Alta's Tmst after Alta's death (the "Plan") constituted a
misrepresentation to the Medicaid authorities. But Lloyd can point to no evidence that
identifies that a representation was made, much less that it was a misrepresentation. He
simply assumes that happened. His burden was to affirmatively establish that Alton had
unclean hands. Winn v. Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 451 (Alaska 1985) (since unclean
hands is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish it).
In his brief, Lloyd argues that Alton "ignores" his own~testimony "and the plain
meaning of the Medicaid requirements." Appellee's Brief at 8-9. No where does Lloyd
identify what testimony Alton allegedly ignored. In fact, Alton identified all of the
potentially relevant testimony, the same testimony identified by Lloyd. See Appellant's
Brief at 10-11.
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Regarding Lloyd's claim that Alton "ignore[d] . . . the plain meaning of the
Medicaid requirements," Lloyd selectively quotes 42 USC Section 1396p(c)(l)1 regarding
a party's eligibility for Medicaid as follows:
. . . if an institutionalized individual. . . disposes of assets for less than fair market
value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual
is ineligible for medical assistance for services . . . .
Lloyd thus does not cite the balance of the subsection (1). The quotation continues as
follows:
. . . described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or in the case of a non-institutionalized
individual, for the services described in paragraph (C)(ii)) during the period
beginning on the date specified in paragraph (D) and equal to the number of
months specified in paragraph (E).
Subparagraph (C)(i) identifies nursing care facilities, institutional facilities that offer
nursing care, and home or community based services. Subparagraph (C)(ii) describes
certain long term care services for noninstitutionalized individuals. Subparagraph (D)
identifies the beginning date with reference both to the date of the transfer and whether
the transfer occurred in any other period of ineligibility. Subparagraph E defines the
period of ineligibility based on a fraction, the numerator of which is the total value of the
assets transferred and the denominator is the average monthly cost of institutionalized
care. It is easy to see why Lloyd quoted this statute selectively. There are numerous facts

1

For convenience of the court, Alton attaches a copy of the relevant statute as
Exhibit A. It is also part of Lloyd's appendix to his Appellee's brief.
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needed to determine whether a person is ineligible for Medicaid, none of which are part
of the record.
Moreover, Lloyd also quotes subsection (b)(1) of Section 1396p as follows:
. . . the state shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following
individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in (a)(1)(B), the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or upon sale of the
property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on
behalf of the individual....
Appellee's Brief at 9. While Lloyd does not explicitly address the relevance of this part of
the Medicaid statute, he apparently is seeking to leave the impression that a court ordered
constructive trust will leave the property subject to an "adjustment or recovery." Even if
this provision is applicable to this case, an adjustment or recovery does not make the
constructive trust remedy illegal or improper. In any event, it is noteworthy to look at the
"individual described in (a)(1)(B)." That subsection states:
(1) No lien may be imposed against the property of an individual prior to his death
on account of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State
plan, except
(B) in the case of real property of an individual (i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is required
as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the State plan,
to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of his income
for personal needs, and
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(ii) with respect to whom the State determines . . . that he cannot reasonably
be expected to be discharged from the medical institution and to return
home.
There is no evidence in the record regarding whether Alta received institutional care, and
if so, where that occurred, nor is there any evidence whether she could "reasonably be
expected . . . to return home." Thus, there is simply no evidentiary basis to determine if
the State must seek or would have ever sought an "adjustment or recovery." In fact, Alton
was prepared to call a Medicaid representative to testify. See R. 242, Transcript 5.2
However, since there was no evidence that a representation or misrepresentation had in
fact occurred, there was no need to call the Medicaid representative as a witness.
Accordingly, the trial court's factual finding that Alton misrepresented the facts to
Medicaid are clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
II. ALTON'S ACTIONS WERE NOT WILFUL AS THEY WERE
FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED BY LLOYD.
Lloyd strains to outline where Alton allegedly acted wilfully and with sufficient
knowledge. However, Lloyd omits that each of his examples of wilfulness and
knowledge were perpetuated by the fraudulent inducements of Lloyd. Alton
unequivocally stated that, but for Lloyd's representations regarding the Plan, Alton would
never have agreed to it. T.78-79

2

The entire transcript is contained at record page 242. All future references to the
transcript will be designated as "T. [page number of transcript]."
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Lloyd cites to petitioner's initial brief, referencing the Lawrence article correctly
stating that the doctrine of unclean hands "usually involved fraud, illegality, unfairness, or
bad faith." See William J. Lawrence III, Note, The Application of the Cleans hands
Doctrine in Damage Actions, 57 Notre Dame Law, 673 Notre Dame Lawyer (1982).
Lloyd infers while Alton's actions were not fraudulent, they fit another of the enumerated
qualifications. Appellee's Brief at 11-12. Alton has not acted fraudulently, illegally,
unfairly or in bad faith. In fact, the trial court found it was Lloyd who acted as such. See
R. 150, FOF 1fl[ 4, 5; 151, FOFffl[22, 23; 153, FOFffif9, 12. Lloyd also quotes from
Petitioner's brief stating: "Any wilful act concerning the cause of action which rightfully
can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause for invocation
of the maxim..." Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. V. Automotive M. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945). Appellee's Brief at 12. Lloyd again omits the overwhelming findings of fact
holding that it was he who acted fraudulently and purposely induced Alton into Lloyd*s
Plan. Lloyd submits that an act that is fraudulently induced cannot be considered
knowing or wilful. Nothing Alton did transgressed equitable standards of conduct
sufficient to invoke the unclean hands doctrine. In fact, it is Lloyd that has transgressed
all equitable standards of conduct.
Lloyd's relies on dicta in the Pledger case without examining its context. Pledger
v. Gillespie, 982 P.2d 572 (Utah 1999). The Pledger court noted specifically that it was
Pledger that sought additional sums from his patient after he had been paid his
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contractually due charges by the patient's insurance company. Id. at 577. The court
brands Pledger with unclean hands because of his "instigation and advancement" of the
litigation after knowing his contract with the insurance company was valid and after he
had been paid his contractually due amount. The phrase "whether knowingly or not" is
dicta and is inapplicable to the case. The court makes no holding regarding fraudulently
induced or unknowing actions because no unknowing actions by Pledger existed. Lloyd's
assertion that such a holding exists is misplaced.
III. A REASONED WEIGHING OF THE ACTIONS AND EQUITIES OF
THE PARTIES GREATLY FAVORS ALTON.
Lloyd correctly recites the discretion enjoyed by the trial court in weighing the
evidence and balancing the equities in pursuit of justice. However, while it is true the
court is afforded wide discretion in deciding such matters, the court's discretion must be
rooted in some directly related findings of fact. The trial court's findings do not support
the ultimate conclusions it reached. As outlined in Petitioner's initial brief, even a
cursory weighing of the actions and equities of the parties illustrates that Lloyd was the
wrongdoer. See Appellant's initial Brief at 15, 16. The court's findings of fact clearly
illustrate this conclusion.

See R. 150, FOFffif4, 5; 151, FOF Tflf 22, 23; 153, FOFfflf9,

12.
Lloyd makes no attempt to substantiate the trial court's conclusion by conducting
his own weighing. Lloyd only alleges that the public interest is better served by denying
Alton relief. Appellee's Brief at 14. Lloyd utterly fails to acknowledge that the injury
Page 6

exposed to the public from his fraudulent and purposeful actions pose a far greater risk
and inequity than does the innocent and manipulated actions of Alton. As a matter of
public policy, Utah courts should not allow the defrauding party to gain and profit, while
the party whose actions were fraudulently induced is harmed. Alton believes this Court
should weigh the equities based on the facts, since the trial court failed to do so.
Lloyd concludes by stating "even if the equities must be balanced, it is not
inappropriate to give great weight that the proposed transaction would be illegal."
Appellee's Brief at 15. As clearly outlined in Section I, supra, this contention fails since
no evidentiary basis exists to find that the intended transfer was or would have been
illegal. Furthermore, even if it were found that the intended transfer would have been
illegal, while it may be appropriate to consider that fact, that fact alone is not dispositive.
The court must still have a reasonable basis for exercising its discretion. Here the trial
court did not do so. Thus, notwithstanding the broad discretion given to trial court's in
this matter, in this case the trial court abused its discretion based on its own findings of
fact.
CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred when it found misconduct by Alton based on
assumed facts without record evidence to support them; because Alton's actions were not
wilful due to Lloyd's fraudulent inducement and; because a balanced weighing of the
equities and actions of each party heavily favors of Alton, Alton asks this Court to
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reverse the trial court, to order the Court to impose a constructive trust on the Homestead,
and to remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's decision.
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2004.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C

y

^ ^ & E R T N. PRAr^rrffl^V'"
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
Frederick A. Jackman
1327 South 800 East, Suite 110
Orem, Utah 84097
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
on this 2nd day of April, 2004.
/
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EXHIBIT A
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 42 USCS § 1396p
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42 USCS § 1396p

AL SECURITY ACT

RESEARCH GUIDE
Federal Procedure:
17 Fed Proc L Ed, Health, Education, and Welfare § 42:422.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
aliditv of regulations
t t S v e relief
junctive
lidity of regulations
dicaid recipients' challenge to federal regulamplementing 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3), which
es copayments to be "nominal in amount,"
fail even though copayment for inpatient hoserv'ices in Kansas is $325, where Congress has
•d parenthetically in statute, definition of
in'al in amount" long codified in 42 CFR
54(c) because court is bound by Secretary's
relation, since it has been given force and efif law by legislative reenactment and ratificaKansas Hosp. Ass'n v Whiteman (1994, DC
851 F Supp 401, 44 Soc Sec Rep Serv 524.
PP

junctive relief
te is temporarily restrained from implementing
dment to increase co-payment requirement of
caid beneficiaries from $25 to $325 per admisfor inpatient hospital services, where hospitals
ndividuals showed that amendment may cause
separable harm, outweighing any potential
ge caused state by delay, and that public inter-

est favors enforcement of public policy as expressed
in Medicaid statutes and regulations, because plain^ m a k e v . a b i e d a i m ^ p r o p o s e d ]ncrease runs
afoul of 42 USCS § 1396o requirement that any cost
sharing be "nominal." Kansas Hosp_Ass ri v wn.teman (1993, DC Kan) 835 F Supp 1548,42 Soc Sec
Rep Serv 708.
Preliminary injunction is denied hospitals ami
individuals challenging proposed amendment to state
Medicaid plan, where state submitted evidence
showing that proposed increase of co-payment to
$325 was determined after applying 5U percent to
average, or typical, amount agency pays for eacn aay
of inpatient hospital care for Medicaid recipients,
because plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on meir
claim that proposed co-payment is not nonm*in
amount" as required by 42 USCS § 1396o(a)(3),
(b)(3), since amount is consistent with federal regulations permitting state to impose fixed ^ P 3 ^ " 1
amount for inpatient hospital care. Kansas; nosp.
S
Ass'n v Whiteman (1993, ^ / f ^
"^
1556, 42 Soc Sec Rep Serv 716, 4ADD 32 ,tfta
without op sub nom Williams v Whiteman i n CA10 Kan) 36 F3d 1106, reported in^full (1W,
CA10 Kan) 1994 US App LEXIS 25 TO.

396p. Liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfers of assets
Imposition of lien against the property of an individual on account of
medical assistance rendered to him under a State plan. (1) No hen may
>e imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on acorn* of medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under tne otaie
>lan, except—
.
,
(A) pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of benefits incorrectly
paid on behalf of such individual, or
<B) in the case of the real property of an individual—
(i) who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution
under the State plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a
minimal amount of his income required for personal needs, and
(ii) with respect to whom the State determines, after notice and opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with procedures established by
the State), that he cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged trom
the medical institution and to return home,
except as provided in paragraph (2).
(2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph (1)(B) on such individual s
home if—
953

(A) the spouse of such individual,
(B) such individual's child who is under age 21, or (with respect to States
eligible to participate in the State program established under title XVI [42
USCS §§ 1381 et seq ]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or
(with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS
§ 1382c], or
(C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home
and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of at least
one year immediately before the date of the individual's admission to the
medical institution),
is lawfully residing in such home.
(3) Any hen imposed with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph
(1)(B) shall dissolve upon that individual's discharge from the medical
institution and return home.
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under a
State plan. (1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made,
except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the Stale plan in the
case of the following individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(1)(B), the
State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical
assistance paid on behalf of the individual.
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when
the individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical
assistance consisting of—
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, or
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan.
(C)(i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to
receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection
with which assets or resources are disregarded in the manner described
in clause (ii), except as provided in such clause, the State shall seek
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility and
other long-term care services.
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual who received
medical assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan
amendment approved as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or resources—
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care insurance policy; or
(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled to receive)
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy.
954
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(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after
the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time—
(A) when he has no surviving child who is under age 21, or (with respect
to States eligible to participate in the State program established under title
XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in
such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1614 [42 USCS
§ 1382c]; and
(B) in the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection
(a)(1)(B), when—
(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual's
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the date of
the individual's admission to the medical institution), and
(ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the
individual's home for a period of at least two years immediately before
the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution, and
who establishes to the satisfaction of the State that he or she provided
care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at
home rather than in an institution),
is lawfully residing in such home who has lawfully resided in such home
on a continuous basis since the date of the individual's admission to the
medical institution.
(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the
application of this subsection (other than paragraph.(l)(C)) if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of criteria
established by the Secretary.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a
deceased individual—
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate
law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case
of an individual to'whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets. (1)(A) In order to meet
the requirements of this subsection for purposes of section 1902(a)(18)
[42 USCS § 1396a(a)(18)], the State plan must provide that if an
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the
option of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such
an individual) disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE

ineligible for medical assistance for services described in subparagraph
(C)(i) (or, in the case of a nonmstitutionalized individual, for the services
described m subparagraph (C)(n)) during the period beginning on the date
specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E).
(B)(i) The look-back date specified m this subparagraph is a date that is
36 months (or, in the case of payments from a trust or portions of a
trust that are treated as assets disposed of by the individual pursuant to
paragraph (3)(A)(iii) or (3)(B)(ii) of subsection (d), 60 months) before
the date specified in clause (ii).
(li) The date specified in this clause, with respect to—
(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of which the individual both is an institutionalized individual and has applied for
medical assistance under the State plan, or
(II) a nonmstitutionalized individual is the date on which the individual applies for medical assistance under the State plan or, if later,
the date on which the individual disposes of assets for less than fair
market value.
(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to an
institutionalized individual are the following:
(I) Nursing facility services.
(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that of nursing
facility services.
(HI) Home or community-based services furnished under a waiver
granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915 [42 USCS
§ 1396n(c) or (d)].
(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect to a
nonmstitutionalized individual are services (not including any services
described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph (7), (22), or (24)
of section 1905(a) [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(7), (22), or (24)], and, at the
option of a State, other long-term care services for which medical assistance is otherwise available under the State plan to individuals
requiring long-term care.
(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day of the first
month during or after which assets have been transferred for less than fair
market value and which does not occur in any other periods of ineligibility under this subsection.
(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the number of
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall
be equal to—
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of application.
956
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(ii) With respect to a nonmstitutionalized individual, the number of
months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individual shall
not be greater than a number equal to—
(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets transferred
by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or after the look-back
date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), divided by
(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nursing facility
services in the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community
in which the individual is institutionalized) at the time of application.
(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise determined under
clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an asset shall be
reduced—
(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause (i),
by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual
under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, and
(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under clause
(ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable to the individual under clause (i) as a result of such disposal.
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of
paragraph (1) to the extent that—
(A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was
transferred to—
(i) the spouse of such individual;
(ii) a child of such individual who (I) is under age 21, or (II) (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State program established
under title XVI [42 USCS §§ 1381 et seq.]) is blind or permanently and
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to
participate in such program) is blind or disabled as defined in section
1614 [42 USCS § 1382c];
(iii) a sibling of such individual who has an equity interest in such
home and who was residing in such individual's home for a period of
at least one year immediately before the date the individual becomes
an institutionalized individual; or
(iv) a son or daughter of such individual (other than a child described
in clause (ii)) who was residing in such individual's home for a period
of at least two years immediately before the date the individual
becomes an institutionalized individual, and who (as determined by the
State) provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside at home rather than in such an institution or facility;
(B) the assets—
(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the sole
benefit of the individual's spouse,
(ii) were transferred from the individual's spouse to another for the sole
benefit of the individual's spouse,

fUBLic HEALTH AND WELFARE
subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of, the individual's
child described in subparagraph (A)(n)(II), or
(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust described in subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the benefit of an individual under 65
years of age who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)l;
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the State (in accordance with
regulations promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the individual intended
to dispose of the assets either at fair market value, or for other valuable
consideration, (ii) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose
other than to qualify for medical assistance, or (iii) all assets transferred
for less than fair market value have been returned to the individual; or
(D) the State determines, under procedures established by the State (in
accordance with standards specified by the Secretary), that the denial of
eligibility would work an undue hardship as determined on the basis of
criteria established by the Secretary; [.]
(3) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of an asset held by an individual in common with another person or persons in a joint tenancy, tenancy
in common, or similar arrangement, the asset (or the affected portion of such
asset) shall be considered to be transferred by such individual when any action is taken, either by such individual or by any other person, that reduces
or eliminates such individual's ownership or control of such asset.
(4) A State (including a State which has elected treatment under section
1902(f) [42 USCS § 1396a(f)]) may not provide for any period of ineligibility for an individual due to transfer of resources for less than fair market
value except in accordance with this subsection. In the case of a transfer by
the spouse of an individual which results in a period of ineligibility for medical assistance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall, using a
reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretary), apportion such period of ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among the individual and
the individual's spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical
assistance under the State plan.
(5) In this subsection, the term "resources" has the meaning given suck
term in section 1613 [42 USCS § 1382b], without regard to the exclusion
described in subsection (a)(1) thereof.
(d) Treatment of trust amounts. (1) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibility for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title/
[42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified in'
paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established by such individual
(2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall be considered tQ«
have established a trust if assets of the individual were used to form all
or part of the corpus of the trust and if any of the following individuals
established such trust other than by will:
(i) The individual,
(ii) The individual's spouse,
(iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
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authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the
individual's spouse.
(iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the
direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's
spouse.
(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets of any other
person or persons, the provisions of this subsection shall apply to die portion of the trust attributable to the assets of the individual.
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard
to—
(i) the purposes for which a trust is established,
(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion under the trust,
(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions may be made
from the trust, or
(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust.
(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust—
(i) the corpus of the trust shall be considered resources available to the
individual,
(ii) payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall
be considered income of the individual, and
(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered assets
disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c).
(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust—
(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust
could be^made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the
corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment
to the individual could be made shall be considered resources available
to the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or
income—
(I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be considered income
of the individual, and
(II) for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by
the individual subject to subsection (c); and
(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income on the corpus
from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the
individual shall be considered, as of the date of establishment of the
trust (or, if later, the date on which payment to the individual was
foreclosed) to be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of
sdbsection (c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for
purposes of such subsection by including the amount of any payments
made from such portion of the trust after such date.
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts:
(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)]) and
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which is established for the benefit of such individual by a parent,
grandparent, legal guardian of the individual, or a court if the State will
receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf
of the individual under a State plan under this title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et
seq.].
(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an individual if—
(i) the trust is composed only of pension, Social Security, and other
income to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust),
(ii) the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the
death of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual under a State plan under this
title [42 USCS §§ 1396 et seq.], and
(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to individuals described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) [42 USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V)], but does not make such assistance available to individuals for
nursing facility services under section 1902(a)(10)(C) [42 USCS
§ 1396a(a)(10)(C)].
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as
defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42 USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] that meets the
following conditions:
(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-profit association,
(ii) A separate account is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust,
but, for purposes of investment and management of funds, the trust
pools these accounts.
(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for the benefit of
individuals who are disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) [42
USCS § 1382c(a)(3)] by the parent, grandparent, or legal guardian of
such individuals, by such individuals, or by a court,
(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account
upon the death of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust
pays to the State from such remaining amounts in the account an
amount equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on behattf
of the beneficiary under the State plan under this title [42 USCS
§§1396 et seq.].
(5) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards specified by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the application of this subsection with respect to an individual if the individual
establishes that such application would work an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis of criteria established by the Secretary.
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument or device that is similar
to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent and in such manner as
the Secretary specifies.
(e) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
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income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action—
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such
individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's
spouse.
(2) The term "income" has the meaning given such term in section 1612
[42 USCS § 1382a].
(3) The term "institutionalized individual" means an individual who is an
inpatient in a nursing facility, who is an inpatient in a medical institution and
with respect to whom payment is made based on a level of care provided in
a nursing facility, or who is described in section 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI) [42
USCS § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI)].
(4) The term "noninstitutionalized individual" means an individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii).
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1613
[42 USCS § 1382b], without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such section.
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch 531, Title XIX, § 1917, as added Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(b), 96 Stat. 370; Jan. 12, 1983, P. L. 97-448,
Title m , § 309(b)(21), (22);96 Stat. 2410; Dec. 22, 1987, P. L; 100-203, Title
IV, Subtitle C, Part 2, § 4211(h)(12), 101 Stat. 1330-208; July 1, 1988, P.L.
100-360, Title IH, § 303(b), Title IV, Subtitle B, § 411(1)(3)(1), 102 Stat 760,
803; Oct. 13, 1988, P.L. 100-485, Title VI, § 608(d)(16)(B), 102 Stat. 2417;
Dec. 19, 1989, P.L. 101-239, Title VI, Subtitle B, Part 2, § 6411(e)(1), 103
Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, P.L. 103-66, Title XIH, Ch 2, Subch B, Part H,
§§ 13611(aMc), 13612(aMc), 107 Stat. 622, 627.)
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Explanatory notes:
The bracketed period has been added at the end of subsec. (c)(2)(D) to
indicate the probable intent of Congress to include such punctuation.
Effective date of section:
Act Sept. 3, 1982, P. L. 97-248, Title I, Subtitle B, § 132(d), 96 Stat. 373,
which appears as a note to this section, provided in part that this section
"shall become effective on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted
Sept. 3, 1982]."
Amendments:
1983. Act Jan. 12, 1982 (effective as if originally included as a part of this
section as added by Act Sept. 3, 1982, as provided by § 309(c)(2) of the
1983 Act, which appears as 42 USCS § 426-1 note), in subsec. (b)(2)(B),
in the concluding matter, substituted "who has lawfully resided" for "and

